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Abstract
The research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg in the 1990s and early 2000s showed that urban rail
projects often cost more than estimated and carried fewer riders than projected, a
troubling trend suggesting that the forecasts for urban rail projects were too optimistic in
terms of cost and ridership. Inspired by that research, this analysis seeks to extend that
framework to analyze Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). A study of forecast vs. actual costs and
ridership was conducted for 19 BRT projects in the United States. From this, it was found
that the cost projections for these projects tended to be quite accurate, but ridership
projections tended to be quite inaccurate and showed a clear tendency towards an
optimism bias. As BRT becomes a more common choice for rapid transit investment in
the US, this analysis suggests that current ridership forecasting methods still leave much
to be desired.
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Introduction
When it was published, the research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg illustrated a consistent
inaccuracy of urban rail transit project forecasts in regards to cost and ridership.
Compared to road and highway projects, which showed a relatively even distribution
in terms of inaccuracy between those projects that overestimated and underestimated
the costs and usership of the finished project, urban rail projects were consistently
projected under the actual cost and above the actual ridership. Based on these findings,
Flyvbjerg called for greater accountability over forecasts of large-scale transportation
projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005).
In the past several years, BRT has become an increasingly common choice for city
and local governments when investing in rapid transit. At a time when many transit
agencies are experiencing budget cuts and service reductions, the relatively low capital
costs of BRT make it an attractive option for transit agencies looking to expand their
rapid transit services. In 2014 alone, there were 24 BRT projects completed or under
construction in the US (Freemark 2014).
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Compared to the megaprojects and urban rail projects that Flyvbjerg studied, these
BRT projects seem relatively inexpensive. But for many small and mid-size American
cities, a BRT project may represent one of the most significant investments in public
transportation in that community’s history. As such, it is just as important that planners
strive for accuracy when projecting cost and ridership.
Much has been written about the characteristics of BRT and the current state of BRT
development, and there is a substantial body of research regarding the economic and
development impacts of a BRT system, but there is much less research regarding BRT
ridership and cost forecasts. Also, although there is a large body of work on travel
forecasts, most obviously Flyvbjerg’s research, most of it pertains specifically to freeway
or urban rail megaprojects. Given the growing interest in BRT systems among local
governments and transportation professionals, this is a gap in the current research.

Literature Review
There is a large and growing body of research on BRT, most of which generally fits
into one of three categories: the basic characteristics of BRT, the current state of BRT
development, and the economic and development impacts of BRT. In each of these
categories, there is much research comparing the characteristics and impacts of BRT to
those of other forms of rapid transit, particularly light rail.
A substantial amount of work has been written about the service characteristics of
urban transportation modes, including BRT, and this work offers useful parameters
for defining BRT systems and the opportunities for its development. This research
attempted to define the level of service characteristics at which point a system can
be considered “bus rapid transit” and found that BRT is growing in popularity due to
its cost effectiveness and the fact that it can be adapted for use in conventional bus
systems (Vuchic 1992; Jarzab et al. 2002; Levinson et al. 2002). Additionally, the Institute
for Transportation Policy (ITDP), a non-profit organization that provides technical
assistance on public transportation projects and advocates for BRT development, has
developed a ranking system for comparing BRT systems and determining whether a
system meets their standards for what can be considered “true” BRT (Weinstock et al.
2011). This research proved useful for understanding the characteristics of BRT and what
could, even nominally, be considered as such.
Flyvbjerg’s work served as a model for this work. Building on a body of work from
the 1990s and early 2000s, his research examined the accuracy of cost and ridership
forecasts for large transportation projects, particularly urban rail and road projects, and
found that urban rail projects frequently exhibited large cost overruns and typically
presented very optimistic ridership forecasts compared with road projects, due, in part,
to poor forecasting methods and to biases on the part of the forecasters to promote rail
projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005); however, none of Flyvbjerg’s work dealt with bus transit
projects. More recently, the work of Robert Bain has contributed significantly to this
field of research, calling to attention widespread inaccuracy and optimism bias in traffic
forecasts for toll road projects (Bain 2009).
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Another resource dealing with cost and ridership projections was a series of before-andafter studies conducted by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regarding transit
projects that have received New Starts funding (FTA 2006–2016). These studies also
document a tendency to underestimate final construction costs, with the accuracy of
ridership projections varying widely. However, these studies deal mostly with urban and
commuter rail projects, with only a couple of bus transit projects included. This general
lack of attention towards cost and ridership projections for BRT projects is a gap in the
current literature.

Methodology
Funding and ridership information is collected by FTA, but most of this information
deals with transit agencies as a whole rather than individual infrastructure projects. In
cases in which cost and ridership estimates from the transit agency operating the BRT
system were unavailable, the necessary information was obtained from media articles
and government reports. BRT systems in operation in the US for which reliable and
comparable data were not available are not included in this analysis. In total, 19 projects
were included in the final analysis.
The methodologies Flyvbjerg employed in his research served as a guide for this
research. Many projects go through multiple forecasts that change as a project moves
forward through the design and construction phases. In his research, Flyvbjerg used
the project forecasts from the time of the decision to build, arguing that this is the
information available to decisionmakers when they agree to move forward on a project
and, thus, are the most influential in determining the worthiness of a project. These
figures were then compared to the actual figures from the completion of the project to
determine their accuracy (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). This is, in brief, what was attempted in
this analysis, using figures as close to the time of the decision to build as were available.
Given the small number of what the ITDP would refer to as “true” BRT systems in the
US—that is, systems that have all or nearly all of the features of BRT, such as dedicated
lanes, pre-boarding payment, limited stops, and branded service—this analysis also
includes some so-called “BRT-lite” systems (those with only a few of the features of
BRT) and busway projects to produce a statistically-significant sample of BRT projects.
Although not all of these systems fall into what the ITDP would deem “true” BRT, they
do all represent significant investments in public transportation for each of the cities
included here, so their value for an analysis of BRT cost and ridership projections should
not be dismissed.

Individual Case Studies
Note that all dollar values are adjusted to values in the year of expenditure.
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Cleveland, Ohio
The HealthLine is a 7.1-mile BRT line operated by the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority (GCRTA). It opened in October 2008 and features exclusive bus lanes and
median stations for 4.4 miles of the line, with the remaining 2.7 miles using mixed-traffic
curb lanes and sidewalk stops. The HealthLine also uses distinctive station structures,
off-board fare equipment, signal priority for vehicles at traffic intersections (FTA 2012).
ITDP gave the HealthLine the highest ranking of any BRT system in the US, indicating
that they consider it the most complete example of BRT in the US (Weinstock et al.
2011).
Projected capital costs for the HealthLine were $273.4 million according to a 1995
estimate; however, further revisions set estimates ranging from $248.2 million to $317.4
million. Due to cost-effectiveness requirements to receive federal funding, GCRTA
trimmed costs for design elements and vehicle procurement and used management
tools to monitor the project budget (GCRTA 2012). In the end, the actual capital costs
were $197.2 million (GCRTA 2012).
Projected ridership for the HealthLine initially was 21,100 average weekday trips,
although this later was revised to 13,500 (FTA, 2012). Actual ridership on the line was
14,300 average weekday trips as of 2012, well below the initial projection. At the time
of opening, Cleveland was in the midst of a substantial contraction of the regional
economy and a subsequent drop in system-wide transit ridership, which fell by 22%
between 2007 and 2010 (FTA 2012). This may go some way towards explaining why the
actual ridership was so far below early estimates.
El Paso, Texas
The Brio Mesa Corridor is an 8.6-mile BRT-lite line operated by Sun Metro. Completed
in October 2014, the Mesa Corridor route was the first of four planned Brio routes
scheduled to open within the coming years and is currently the only rapid transit
service in El Paso (Sun Metro 2014). The line features branded and landscaped stations,
pre-boarding fare payment, and traffic signal priority.
Projected capital costs for the line were $27.08 million (FTA 2010), with actual capital
costs reported at $27.1 million (Sun Metro 2014). Projected ridership initially was 11,900
average weekday boardings within the opening year (FTA 2010), but this was revised to
around 3,000 riders per day prior to Brio’s opening. Actual ridership was below even this
lowered revision, with 52,000 average monthly boardings as of July 2016 (Wilcox 2016),
an average of about 2,000 riders each operating day (Brio currently operates only six
days per week).
Escondido, California
The Breeze Rapid is a 6-mile BRT-lite service operated by the North County Transit
District (NCTD). Service began in June 2011 and features queue jump lanes at select
intersections, traffic signal priority, bus station improvements, and branded service.
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Projected capital costs for the system were $2.79 million, according to a NCTD 2006
concept study, with actual capital costs at $4.21 million. The Breeze Rapid came in over
budget due, in large part, to revised plans for one intersection, at which a proposed
queue jump lane was extended that required widening of the roadway for a full block to
accommodate the new lane.1
No formal ridership projection for the service was conducted; as the first instance of a
rapid bus service in the region, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG),
the regional planning agency for San Diego County, treated it as a technology and
concept demonstration that upgraded an existing local bus route rather than a project
to significantly boost ridership.2
Eugene, Oregon
The Emerald Express (EmX) is a BRT system operated by the Lane Transit District (LTD).
An initial 4-mile segment opened in January 2007, with a 7.8-mile extension opening in
January 2011. The EmX uses dedicated bus lanes for nearly 60% of its route, with a traffic
signal priority system and branded stations with raised platforms, pre-boarding fare
payment, and real-time bus arrival signs. The system has been noted as a BRT success
story by the ITDP (Weinstock et al. 2011), constructed within budget and with ridership
exceeding stated expectations.
Projected capital costs were $24.6 million for the initial segment and $43.1 million for
the extension. These proved to be reasonably accurate, with actual capital costs being
$24.6 million for the initial segment and $41.3 million for the extension.3
It was projected that the served corridor would see an increase of 40% over the first 20
years of service. In fact, there was a ridership increase of 63% in the corridor over the
first year of service and 122% over the first four years. The 2011 extension was projected
to increase ridership along the EmX line by 3,700 additional weekday boardings. After
completion, the extension reached 80% of this projection within one year and exceeded
it in the second year of service. Currently, weekday ridership averages 10,000+ during
the school year and exceeds 11,000 in some months, 135% of the estimate predicted for
the line after completion of the extension.4
Fort Collins, Colorado
MAX is a 5-mile BRT line operated by Transfort. The line opened in May 2014 and
features a dedicated transit-only busway for most of the route, branded service, preboarding fare payment, and platform-level boarding at all stations along the route.

1

Information obtained through personal communication with D. Veeh, December 30, 2013.

2

Ibid.

3

Information obtained through personal communication with A. Vobora, February 8, 2014.

4

Ibid.
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Projected capital costs for the system were $81.98 million (FTA 2009), with actual capital
costs coming in at $86.83 million (Duggan 2014). Projected ridership was 3,900 average
weekday boardings (FTA, 2009). MAX managed to exceed this figure after its first year of
service, with 4,680 average daily boardings in September 2015 (de la Rosa 2015).
Grand Rapids, Michigan
The Silver Line is a 9.8-mile BRT-lite service operated by the Interurban Transit
Partnership. The line opened in August 2014 and features stations with a sidewalk
snowmelt system, next bus signage, platform-level boarding, pre-boarding fare payment,
and designated bus-only travel lanes along portions of the route during peak weekday
travel periods.
Projected capital costs were $37 million (FTA 2010), with actual capital costs being $40
million (Krietz 2014). Projected ridership was 7,200 average weekday boardings in the
first year (FTA 2010). Actual ridership fell well below this mark, with only 2,300 average
weekday boardings as of March 2016 (Khut 2016).
Kansas City, Missouri
The Troost Avenue MAX is a 13-mile BRT-lite service operated by the Kansas City
Area Transportation Authority (KCATA). Following the successful implementation of
the MAX bus rapid transit line along Main Street in July 2005, KCATA began pursuing
implementation of a second line along Troost Avenue, roughly one mile west of and
parallel to the existing Main Street MAX line. As of 2007, the Main Street MAX line
had resulted in a 20% growth in ridership along the Main Street corridor, and planners
expected similar results from the new Troost Avenue line (FTA 2007). The Troost
Avenue MAX opened in January 2011 and features dedicated bus lanes, traffic signal
prioritization, branded buses and stations.
Projected capital costs for the line were $30.73 million (FTA 2007), with actual capital
costs at $30.6 million (KCATA 2010). Projected ridership was 9,000 average weekday
boardings after the first year of service (FTA 2007). This proved to be reasonably
accurate, with actual ridership at 8,500 average weekday boardings following one year of
service (KCATA 2012).
Las Vegas, Nevada
Since opening the MAX BRT line along North Las Vegas Boulevard in 2004, RTC Transit
has developed an extensive express bus network that extends across much of the city,
with multiple lines that incorporate varying features of BRT service. Notable additions
to the system include the launch of the Strip & Downtown Express (SDX) service in
2010, the Boulder Highway Express service in 2011, and the Sahara Express service in
2012. Of these four lines, only the Sahara Express had reliable documentation of cost
and ridership projections readily available for this analysis.
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The Sahara Express is a 12-mile BRT line that opened in May 2012 and features sheltered
stops with raised-level boarding, dedicated bus lanes along most of the route, doubledecker buses, traffic signal priority, and landscaping improvements and widened
sidewalks along the corridor. Projected capital costs were $43.56 million (RTCSNV 2009),
with actual capital costs at $45.2 million. Projected ridership was 13,900 average daily
boardings in 2013 (RTCSNV 2009). Actual ridership fell short of this projection, with only
10,000 average daily boardings in 2012 (Christensen 2012), with those figures remaining
largely consistent through reported figures in April 2013 and April 2014 (RTCSNV 2014).
Los Angeles, California
The Orange Line is a BRT line operated by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, better known as Metro. An initial 14-mile segment opened
in October 2005, with a 4-mile extension opening in June 2012. The Orange Line is
regarded as one of the first “true” BRT systems in the US and uses a dedicated roadway
along a former Southern Pacific Railroad branch line through the San Fernando Valley.
The line features dedicated stations, pre-boarding fare payment, and a bikeway along
the initial segment.
Projected capital costs were $340.4 million for the initial segment (Metro 2003) and
$135 million for the extension (Guccione 2006; Callaghan and Vincent 2007). Actual
capital costs were $323.6 million for the initial segment, with an extra $26 million for
an additional station that opened in December 2006 (Callaghan and Vincent 2007) and
$154 million for the extension (Bloomekatz 2012).
Projected ridership was 5,000 to 7,500 average weekday boardings for the first year of
service and 22,000 average weekday boardings by 2020 on the initial segment (Callaghan
and Vincent 2007). Actual ridership far outpaced these projections, with 21,828 average
weekday boardings in May 2006 (Callaghan and Vincent 2007), a figure that grew to
nearly 24,000 average weekday boardings in October 2010 and 26,614 average weekday
boardings in October 2011 (Hymon 2012). Prior to completion of the extension, Metro
projected that the entire line including the extension would carry 45,000 daily riders
by 2030 (Anderson 2012); whether this goal will be met remains to be seen, but average
weekday Orange Line ridership rose from 26,670 in May 2012, one month prior to
completion of the extension, to 31,780 in October 2013.5
Minneapolis, Minnesota
The METRO Red Line is an 11-mile BRT-lite service operated by Metro Transit. It
opened in June 2013 and uses bus-only shoulder lanes between the Twin City suburbs
of Bloomington and Apple Valley, with plans for a further extension south to the
community of Lakeville.
The project was faced with construction setbacks, and the phasing of the project
changed over time. The original plan was to implement the full Bloomington-Lakeville
5

Information obtained through personal communication with D. Mieger, December 18, 2013.
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project in four phases with various elements of capital and operating investment in each
phase. However, the most recent plan changed the investment strategy to three phases
and altered the timing of the elements included in each stage. Operational costs for the
system were cut back during construction, causing the initial roll-out of the system to
be scaled back to a less-frequent service than originally planned. Projected capital costs
under this revised plan were $118 million, with the actual capital cost at $112 million.6
Projected ridership was initially 2,250 average daily boardings, with a revised figure of
960 average daily boardings in the first year of service, following the reduction in service
plans.7 Actual ridership was 975 average daily boardings in August 2014 (Van Berkel
2014), comparable to the revised figure but well below the initial projection.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
The West Busway is a 5-mile dedicated busway used by the Port Authority of Allegheny
County. Completed in 2000, the busway was originally planned to be 8.1 miles long and
projected to cost $328.8 million to build (FTA 2003). However, the estimate rose to $515
million following issues with land acquisition from freight rail company CONRAIL and
problems with the development of a proposed new HOV bridge over the Monongahela
River into Downtown Pittsburgh. Ultimately, the CONRAIL land acquisition and
proposed bridge elements were abandoned from the plan, and the project was scaled
down from 8.1 miles to 5 miles, bringing the actual capital costs for the revised project
down to $326.8 million (FTA 2003), technically within the projected cost for the project
but only after these significant changes to the proposal were made. Projected ridership
for the busway was 7,000 riders per day (FTA 2003), with actual weekday ridership
being more than 8,700 riders in October 2002 (FTA 2003) and growing to a peak daily
ridership of 10,000 in 2004 (Vincent 2004) before leveling off in later years.
Another Port Authority of Allegheny County busway project in Pittsburgh was the East
Busway Swissvale extension, a 2.3-mile extension of the East Busway that was completed
in 2003. Projected capital costs for the extension were $62.8 million (FTA 1998), with
actual capital costs being $68.8 million (Grata 2003). Projected ridership for the project
was an additional 3,800 daily riders on the East Busway by 2005 (FTA 1998). Instead,
there were only an additional 2,000 daily riders as of 2004 (Vincent 2004), with ridership
falling since, dropping from an average of 30,000 daily riders in 2004 (Vincent 2004)
to 25,600 in 2011 (Weinstock et al. 2011). The fall in ridership along the East Busway
occurred at a time when annual ridership had fallen overall for the Port Authority of
Allegheny County, dropping from 66 million passenger trips in 2001 to 63.8 million in
2011 (NTD 2002 and 2012).

6

Information obtained through personal communication with C. Hiniker, December 17, 2013.

7

Ibid.
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Reno, Nevada
The RTC RAPID is a 4.5-mile BRT-lite line operated by the Regional Transportation
Commission of Washoe County (RTC). The service opened in Fall 2009, with additional
phases completed in 2011 and 2013 that added more specialized BRT elements, and it
currently features articulated buses, traffic signal priority, branded stations, floor-level
boarding platforms, and off-board fare collection.
Projected capital costs for the system were $13.43 million, with actual capital costs
at $15.35 million.8 Projected ridership for the line was 2,660,000 boardings along the
served corridor in FY 2010 and 3,079,283 boardings in FY 2013. Actual ridership fell
short of these projections, with only 1,665,702 boardings along the served corridor in
FY 2010 and 1,822,018 in FY 2013.9 Following the Great Recession, there was a systemwide reduction in ridership and service cuts, resulting in falling ridership along the
corridor served by RTC RAPID in its opening years. Ridership along the corridor failed
to reach FY 2007 levels (prior to introduction of the RTC RAPID) until FY 2012. Since
introduction of the RTC RAPID service, ridership has grown by almost 10% in the
corridor, a modest increase but still falling below early projections.10
San Antonio, Texas
VIA Primo is a 20-mile BRT-lite service operated by VIA Metropolitan Transit. Opened
in December 2012, the service features branded stations and vehicles and a traffic signal
priority system. Projected capital costs for the system were $40.1 million, with actual
capital costs being $35 million. Projected ridership was 5,000 to 8,000 average daily
riders following one year of service. Actual ridership fell within this range, with 5,800
average daily riders following one year of service.11
San Bernardino, California
The sbX Green Line is a 15.7-mile BRT line operated by Omnitrans. Opened for service
in April 2014, the line features dedicated bus lanes for portions of the route, sheltered
stations with platform-level boarding and ticket vending machines, and branded service.
Projected capital costs for the line were $191.7 million (FTA 2010), which proved
accurate judging from reports following completion (Starcic 2015). Projected ridership
was 5,600 average daily boardings within opening year (FTA 2010). Actual ridership fell
well short of this mark, with only 2,300 average daily boardings as of June 2015 (Wall
2015). Omnitrans officials have pointed to delays in the opening of a new transit center
in Downtown San Bernardino, which originally was planned to open in tandem with the

8

Information obtained through personal communication E. Park, January 27, 2014.

9

Information obtained through personal communication R. Henson, February 26, 2014.

10

Ibid.

11

Information obtained through personal communication with J. Aguilera, February 7, 2014.
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launch of the Green Line, as a factor in the line’s low first year ridership (Wall 2015). The
transit center finally opened in September 2015.
San Diego, California
The Mid-City Rapid, also branded the Rapid 215, is a 10-mile BRT-lite line operated by
the Metropolitan Transit System (MTS). Service began in October 2014 and features
dedicated travel lanes along a small portion of the route, distinctive sheltered stations, a
traffic signal priority system, and specially-branded articulated buses.
Projected capital costs for the service were $43.3 million (FTA 2008). Actual capital
costs were $44 million (SANDAG 2014). Projected ridership was initially 15,000 average
daily boardings upon opening (FTA 2008), although this figure was revised to 7,000 to
9,000 average daily boardings before the opening of the project (Keatts 2014). Actual
ridership seems to have fallen short of this mark, with only 6,500 average daily boardings
as of June 2015 (Schaver 2015). More recent ridership data have not been made publicly
available as of this writing; without figures from after a full year of service, ridership data
have been excluded from the final analysis.
Snohomish County, Washington
Swift is a 16.7-mile BRT-lite service operated by Community Transit. Opened in
November 2009, the service features seven miles of transit-only lanes, traffic signal
priority, articulated buses, and branded stations with pre-boarding fare collection.
Projected capital costs were $15–20 million (Community Transit 2005), with actual
capital costs turning out to be $29 million, with 4 stations included in the original plan
deferred until 2011 due to funding issues (Community Transit 2011). Projected ridership
was 2,500 average weekday boardings after one year of service and 4,000 average
weekday boardings after four years of service (Duke 2010). Actual ridership exceeded
these projections, with 3,500 average weekday boardings after one year of service (Duke
2010), and 4,400 average weekday boardings after four years of service (Munguia 2013).
Swift ridership grew despite a system-wide reduction in ridership (Munguia 2010) and
service cuts in 2010 and 2012, which reduced service frequency and operating hours for
the BRT service (Munguia 2012). Annual ridership for Community Transit dropped from
11.4 million in 2009 to 9.1 million in 2012 (NTD 2010, 2013).
The following table summarizes the above case studies, comparing the predicted and
actual costs in constant US dollars per mile and the predicted and actual ridership.
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TABLE 1. Summary of Individual Case Studies

*Original West Busway proposal was an 8.1-mile project.
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Results
The BRT projects studied generally had more accurate cost estimates than the urban rail
projects studied by Flyvbjerg. Of the 19 projects for which adequate cost information
could be obtained, the actual capital costs of 10 came within 5% of their projected cost,
and 16 came within 15% of their projected cost. However, although there was a high
number of accurate or nearly accurate cost forecasts, the data also show a propensity
towards projects coming in over their estimated budget, with 7 exceeding the projected
cost by at least 5%, compared to only 2 that underestimated it by at least 5% (Figure 1).
Of the projects described, the two that were far over budget (by at least 15%) were BRTlite systems that had such low capital costs that even a difference of a few million dollars
had a large proportional effect.
FIGURE 1.
Distribution of actual cost as
percentage of predicted cost

When it comes to ridership estimates, however, the overall picture is much different. Of
the 16 projects for which adequate ridership data could be obtained, only 2 came within
10% of their projected ridership. The ridership projections also showed a propensity
towards being over the actual ridership figures, with 8 projects seeing ridership at least
10% below what was projected versus only 6 seeing ridership at least 10% above the
estimates (Figure 2).
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FIGURE 2.
Distribution of actual
ridership as percentage of
predicted ridership

Discussion
Whereas there was a propensity towards projects coming in over budget among the
systems studied, the level of accuracy shown suggests that BRT projects in the US do
not suffer from the same level of cost estimate inaccuracies as the urban rail projects
studied by Flyvbjerg or FTA. In general, the accuracy of the estimated costs for these
systems was very good.
However, although there was a high level of accuracy in the cost estimates, it is worth
noting that in a few cases these BRT projects came within budget only due to a scaling
back of the project from what was initially proposed. This was particularly evident
in the case of the Western Busway in Pittsburgh, where the scope of the project was
significantly reduced, and to a lesser extent with the HealthLine in Cleveland, when the
expense of certain design elements was scaled back.
The ridership estimates, on the other hand, not only showed a high level of inaccuracy
but also a clear propensity towards predicting ridership higher than the actual results.
This shows that current ridership forecasting methods still leave something to be
desired and suggests that many US public transit agencies may be too optimistic as to
the ridership outcomes of their BRT projects. In some cases, the underperformance of
these projects has been attributed to outside factors; in San Bernardino, for instance,
delays in the opening of a new transit center were blamed for their BRT system’s low
initial ridership.
A common theme among several of these projects was the effect of the Great Recession
on ridership: in Cleveland, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Reno, overall transit ridership
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dropped as a result of the recession and subsequent cuts to transit service, which likely
was a factor in causing new BRT projects in these cities to fail to live up to ridership
expectations. However, the recession cannot account for all of the underperforming
systems included here; some of the newest systems studied, such as those in El Paso,
Grand Rapids, and San Bernardino, performed below expectations despite the fact that
their ridership estimates were generated well after the start of the Great Recession.
Additionally, there is little to suggest that ridership forecasts have gotten more accurate
over time (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3.
Accuracy of ridership
forecasts by year

It is worth noting that ridership alone is not the only measure of success that can be
applied to a public transportation infrastructure project, and, with few exceptions, the
figures shown here reflect only the initial years of operating service. But transportation
professionals should strive for a high degree of accuracy when discussing the potential
benefits of a public transportation project, especially if they seek public confidence
to expand public transportation infrastructure and service in the US in the years to
come. It is not the intent of this research to question the worthiness of any of these BRT
projects, but to note that a very common failing is occurring in the process of justifying
these projects.
When applying for federal funding from FTA, three approaches can be taken to
provide a ridership forecast: 1) using a region-wide travel model, 2) using incremental
data-driven methods, which rely on existing ridership data and make projections by
estimating the effects of proposed or expected changes, or 3) using FTA’s Simplified
Trips-on-Project Software (STOPS) created by FTA, a simplified version of the standard
four-step travel model (FTA 2016). When creating ridership projections for future years,
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all three of these approaches rely on data input by local or regional agencies, including
expected population and employment patterns. This brings us to a key weakness with
standard travel forecasting methods: local governments and agencies in the US tend to
be optimistic about future growth in population, employment, and transit ridership in
their communities.
In his work, Flyvbjerg advocated for the adoption of “reference class forecasting,” in
which an outside view of a proposed project would be enforced by comparing it to
the outcomes of a reference group of similar projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). Although
there are inherent difficulties in determining which projects serve as adequate reference
points and compensating for the unique characteristics of any single project, such
an approach would avoid many of the drawbacks of current standard approaches, in
particular the tendency towards optimistic future growth forecasts. With a growing
number of BRT projects in the US, there is a growing reference class of projects to use.
Flyvbjerg also pointed out that current funding mechanisms, in which transportation
projects across the country compete against each other for crucial federal funding,
create an incentive for local planners to oversell the benefits of their projects (Flyvbjerg
et al. 2005). This could be addressed either by adopting different funding mechanisms,
in which transportation projects do not have to compete directly against each other at
the federal level, or by applying more rigorous scrutiny to ridership forecasts, perhaps by
comparing them to similar projects as suggested above.

Conclusions
In recent years, BRT has become an increasingly-common option for local and regional
agencies when investing in public transit infrastructure. The results of this analysis show
that BRT projects in the US do very well when holding to their cost projections, but fall
short where it comes to ridership projections. Although they skewed slightly towards
being completed over budget, the cost estimates of the BRT projects studied tended to
be far more accurate than the urban rail projects Flyvbjerg studied. But the widespread
inaccuracy of the ridership estimates among the projects studied demonstrates
that a more critical eye should be directed towards ridership projections. Although
there is much inherent difficulty in accurately predicting future transit ridership, the
tendency towards overestimating ridership shown here suggests a bias similar to that
demonstrated by Flyvbjerg’s research.
BRT offers an excellent opportunity for many communities to invest in high-quality
public transportation. However, the results of this research suggest that there may be a
tendency to oversell the benefits of these projects. With many new BRT projects under
construction and opening in the years to come, it is important that transportation
professionals apply more rigorous methodology to the ridership projections for these
projects.
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